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If a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust has a right to withdraw property from the
trust, may the beneficiary‟s creditors reach the assets subject to the withdrawal power?
That was the principle question recently addressed by the 1st District Court of Appeals in
Great American Insurance Company v. Thompson Trust.1 Also of interest: the case may
have involved an offset by the trustee of amounts distributable to the beneficiary to repay
amounts owed by the beneficiary to the trust.

Background.
When she died, Patricia Smith Thompson‟s will created a testamentary spendthrift
trust (the “Trust”) for the benefit of her husband, Morley.2 The terms of the Trust gave
Mr. Thompson the annual right to withdraw from principal the greater of $5,000 or 5% of
the value of the trust assets.3
As executor for Mrs. Thompson‟s estate, Mr. Thompson improperly disposed of
trust assets. The resulting litigation was settled, but Mr. Thompson did not pay more than
$1.3 million that he was obligated to pay to the Trust under the settlement agreement. His
default led the probate court to issue an order that while his debt to the Trust was unpaid,
no further distributions were to be made to Mr. Thompson from the Trust. Rather, any
amounts he otherwise would have been entitled to receive from the Trust were to be
applied against his debt to the Trust.4
1

A year and a half later, Great American Life Insurance Company (“GALIC”)
obtained a default judgment against Mr. Thompson for nearly $5.8 million in connection
with obligations he had guaranteed. Shortly thereafter, GALIC filed a creditor‟s bill and
complaint under R.C. §2333.01 against Mr. Thompson and the Trust. (Under §2333.01,
judgment creditors may reach, among other things, any interest of the debtor in “a money
contract, claim, or chose in action, due or to become due to him, or in a judgment or
order, or money, goods, or effects which he has in the possession of any person or body
politic or corporate.”) The Trust defended the action on three grounds: (1) that the
spendthrift provision prohibited GALIC from reaching Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the
Trust; (2) that the probate court‟s order prevented GALIC‟s lien from attaching to Mr.
Thompson‟s interest in the Trust; and (3) that if and to the extent GALIC could secure a
lien against Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the Trust, it was junior to the Trust‟s claim.

Although Mr. Thompson did not respond and had another default judgment issued
against him, GALIC‟s claim against the Trust was tried. The trial court rejected each of
the Trust‟s defenses. As summarized in the appellate court‟s opinion: “The trial court
concluded that the spendthrift provision did not prohibit Great American from asserting
an equitable lien on the nondiscretionary trust distributions5 to Thompson, and that Great
American had a priority lien on that money in preference to the … Trust, despite the
probate court‟s order directing the trustees to retain any money due to Thompson in order
to pay off Thompson‟s debt to the trust.”6 The court of appeals affirmed.

Spendthrift Protection.

In 1991, in Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., the Ohio Supreme Court broadly upheld
the validity of spendthrift provisions.7 The appellate court in Great American, however,
distinguished Mr. Thompson‟s withdrawal power from a beneficial interest in a trust that
is protected by a spendthrift provision. A power of withdrawal is a presently exercisable
general power of appointment.8 The question was thus whether GALIC, as a creditor of
the holder of a presently exercisable general power (over assets in a spendthrift trust of
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which the holder is a beneficiary), could reach the assets subject to the power. In holding
that it could, the court characterized the rule to that effect under the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts as “black-letter trust law.”9 While the Restatement‟s rule the court relied on
may well be the right one from a policy perspective – given that the holder of an
unconditional presently exercisable power has unrestricted, unilateral access to the
property subject to the power for the holder‟s own benefit – it is an overstatement to
describe it as black letter law.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Property, the rule – that creditors of a
holder of an unexercised, presently exercisable general power of appointment may reach
the property subject to the power – is inconsistent with the law of most states, and is not
the law except to the extent a statute so provides.10 Statutes in a number of states do so
provide,11 although in most, creditors may reach the appointive assets only if other
property available for payment of their claims is insufficient.12 Similarly, the rule under
federal bankruptcy law is that the power holder‟s creditors may reach property subject to
a presently exercisable general power of appointment,13 and federal tax law also treats the
holder of such a power as the owner of the property subject to the power.14 Case law in
several states does not allow creditors of an unexercised, but presently exercisable
general power to reach property subject to the power, however.15 Similarly, statutes in
Alaska and Rhode Island do not allow a power holder‟s creditors to reach the property
subject to the power unless it not only is a general power, but also is exercised in favor of
the holder, the holder‟s estate, or the creditors of either.16

Consistent with the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), the pending Ohio Trust Code
(OTC) reaches the same result as does the Restatement (Third) of Trusts by treating a
power of withdrawal as equivalent to the power of a settlor to revoke a revocable trust,17
thus allowing creditors of the power holder to reach the assets subject to the power.18
(Note, however, that under the OTC and the UTC, that result applies only “during the
period the power may be exercised.”19 Further, if the holder allows the power to lapse,
the holder will be treated as the settlor of the trust only to the extent the value of the
property affected by the lapse exceeds the greater of the 5 x 5 amount or the annual
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exclusion amount, which under the OTC is doubled if the donor of the gift to the trust is
married at the time of the transfer.20) The rationale for the OTC and UTC treatment is
that a presently exercisable general power and the power of a settlor to revoke a
revocable trust are “functionally equivalent.”21 Thus, the result in Great American – that
GALIC could reach the property subject to Mr. Thompson‟s right of withdrawal despite
the spendthrift provision – would also be reached under the OTC.

Prior Probate Court Order.
As mentioned above, before GALIC filed its creditor‟s bill and complaint, the
probate court issued an order directing that any amounts otherwise distributable to Mr.
Thompson from the Trust instead be retained in the Trust to reduce his $1.3 million
obligation to the Trust. In its appeal, the Trustee argued that the trial court erred in
granting GALIC a secured priority interest in amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw
under the 5 x 5 power in preference to the Trust‟s interest in those amounts. The appellate
court disagreed, finding that the probate court‟s order did not amount to a lien on Mr.
Thompson‟s interest. Citing 51 American Jurisprudence 2d of Liens (2004), §11, the
court stated that “[l]iens may only be created by agreement or by a fixed rule of law, but
not by courts.”22 Further, while characterizing the Trust as a creditor of Mr. Thompson,
the court noted that the Trustee “never sought to obtain a lien or to secure its interest in
Thompson‟s right to withdraw money at the end of each year.”23 Accordingly, the Trust
was an unsecured creditor “whose interest in Thompson‟s right to withdraw was
subordinate to Great American‟s secured interest.”24
Mr. Thompson’s Income Interest?
According to the appellate court‟s opinion, Mr. Thompson not only had a 5 x 5
power to withdraw principal from the Trust, he also was entitled to receive its income.25
The appeal, however, did not involve Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the Trust‟s income.
Rather, the parties‟ briefs, and the appellate court‟s opinion, address only the question
whether GALIC could reach amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw by exercising his 5
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x 5 power. Because the probate court ruled that “no further distributions be made to
Morley Thompson regardless of any circumstance or entitlement,” with any distributions
he otherwise would be entitled to receive to be applied to his debt to the Trust, the
implication is that income distributions otherwise to be made to him instead were to be
offset against his debt to the Trust despite its spendthrift nature. Curiously, however,
there is no mention in either party‟s brief of Mr. Thompson being entitled to receive
distributions of Trust income.

If in fact Mr. Thompson was entitled to receive distributions of Trust income, in
addition to having the right to withdraw principal under the 5 x 5 power, the question
whether the Trustee could offset the Trust‟s income against Mr. Thompson‟s debt to the
Trust, despite the spendthrift provision, would be raised. Because of the breadth of the
Ohio Supreme Court‟s opinion in Scott upholding spendthrift provisions,26 in my view it
is doubtful that an offset spendthrift exception would be created by an Ohio court under
existing law.27 Further, the pending Ohio Trust Code lists only two spendthrift
exceptions28 and expressly states that they and three others are the only exceptions to the
effectiveness of a spendthrift provision.29 Because a trustee‟s claim against a spendthrift
trust beneficiary is not among those exceptions, presumably such a claim could not be
successfully asserted under the OTC.

1

2006 WL 199751, 2006-Ohio-304.
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The facts recited in this article are taken not only from the court‟s opinion, but also from the parties‟

briefs. The spendthrift provision in the trust instrument explicitly prohibited the voluntary or involuntary
alienation of Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the trust.
3

The court‟s opinion states that Mr. Thompson could withdraw “$5,000, plus 5% of the fair market value

of the trust,” but the withdrawal provision, reproduced in the appellee‟s brief, provides that the 5% Mr.
Thompson could withdraw at the end of the year was to be reduced by any amounts he had previously
withdrawn during the year (i.e., any of the $5,000 that he had withdrawn during the year).
4

The appellee‟s brief states that Mr. Thompson exercised the withdrawal power for the year 2001 and

withdrew nearly $490,000, indicating the trust had a value at that time of nearly $10,000,000, and that he
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withdrew nearly $377,000 more for 2002. In both cases, the withdrawals were not actually made to him,
but were applied against his debt to the Trust.
5

It is clear from the court‟s opinion that its reference to “nondiscretionary trust distributions” refers to

amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw from the Trust by exercising his 5 x 5 power.
6

Supra note 1, at paragraph 5.
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62 Ohio St.3d 39, 577 N.E.2d 1077 (1991). The Court‟s syllabus in Scott states that: “2. A trust

beneficiary has no greater interest in the trust property than that given by the trust agreement. 3. The
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust has no interest that is liable to the execution of a judgment. 4. Spendthrift
trusts will be enforced in Ohio."
8

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, §§11.4, cmt. a, and 11.5 (1986).

9

Supra note 1, at paragraph 9. Under the Third Restatement: “An intended spendthrift restraint is …

invalid with respect to a nonsettlor's interest in trust property over which the beneficiary has the equivalent
of ownership, entitling the beneficiary to demand immediate distribution of the property. Thus, if an
income beneficiary also holds a presently exercisable general power of appointment (that is, a power
currently to compel distribution of trust property to the power holder), a spendthrift restraint will not
prevent the beneficiary's creditors … from reaching the property that is subject to the power.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 58, cmt. b(1) (2003).
10

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 and Reporter‟s Note 1 to §13.2

(1986). The rationale for the traditional rule “is that the donee of a general power has no property interest in
the appointive property unless the donee exercises that power, and that the right to do so is personal to the
donee. As Lord Justice Fry once said: „The power of a person to appoint an estate to himself is, in my
judgment, no more his „property‟ than the power to write a book or to sing a song.‟ In re Armstrong, 17
Q.B.D. 521, 536 (1886).” JESSE DUKEMINIER ET. AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 594 (7th ed. 2005).
11

See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 10-7.2 and 10-7.4 (McKinney 1998).

12

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 682(a) (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.123 (1979); MINN. STAT. §

502.70 (1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 299.9 (1981); WIS. STAT. § 702.17 (1980).
13

11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (1994).

14

See, e.g., I.R.C. §2041.

15

See, e.g., Univ. Nat‟l Bank v. Rhoadarmer, 827 P.2d. 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Irwin Union Bank &

Trust Co. v. Long, 312 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
16

See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.115 (Michie 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-13 (1969).

17

See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(1) (2005); Ohio Trust Code §5805.06(B)(1).
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See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(1) (2005); Ohio Trust Code §5805.06(A)(1).
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See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(1) (2005); Ohio Trust Code §5805.06(A)(1).
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See Ohio Trust Code §5805.06(B)(2).

21

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. (2005). For criticisms of the traditional rule under which creditors of the

holder of a presently exercisable general power of appointment may not reach property subject to the
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power, see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.17 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); LEWIS SIMES & ALLEN F.
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 944 (2d ed., 1956); Olin L. Browder, Jr., Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1255, 1272 (1960); Berger, The General Power of Appointment as an Interest in Property, 40 NEB.
L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1960); and Roy Lee Steers, Jr. Note, Creditors' Ability to Reach Assets Under a
General Power of Appointment, 24 VAND. L. REV. 367 (1971).
22

See supra note 1, at paragraph 13.
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See supra note 1, at paragraph 14.
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Id.

25

See supra note 1, at paragraph 4.
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See supra note 7.
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Arguably, a spendthrift provision should not be effective against a claim by the trustee, however, because

the trustee is the owner of the trust property. Thus, a spendthrift provision prohibiting the voluntary or
involuntary transfer of the beneficiary‟s interest would not apply to the trustee with an offset claim, because
the trustee would be retaining property, rather than transferring it. However, trust beneficiaries have an
equitable, or beneficial, interest in the assets of the trust. Allowing a trustee to offset property that
otherwise is distributable to the beneficiary against amounts owed by the beneficiary to the trust would be
involuntarily – from the beneficiary‟s perspective – alienating the beneficiary‟s equitable interest in the
trust. For more on the offset exception to spendthrift protection, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 59,
cmt. a(2) and Rptr. Notes (2003).
28

See Ohio Trust Code §5805.02(B). These two exceptions relate to (i) support claims of a child or current

spouse and (ii) the United States or the State of Ohio, to the extent federal law or the Revised Code so
provide.
29

See Ohio Trust Code §5805.02(E). The other three exceptions are under (i) §5805.05(B), which permits a

creditor to reach mandatory distributions owed to a beneficiary if they are not made within a reasonable
time, even if the trust‟s terms include a spendthrift provision; (ii) §5805.06, which permits creditors of a
settlor/beneficiary to reach his or her interest, even if the trust‟s terms include a spendthrift provision; and
(iii) §5810.04, which permits the court to award costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees to any party,
to be paid by another party, from the trust, of from a party‟s interest in the trust, even if the trust‟s terms
include a spendthrift provision.
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